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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Dispute over "Mandatory" Employment Arbitration
The dispute over "mandatory" employment arbitration is one of the most
important political issues in employment relations today. The political and legal
debate raised by this issue has reached the Supreme Court three times in the past
decade, forcing the Court to grapple with the legality of employment arbitration
agreements. 1 And the Supreme Court is just the tip of the iceberg.
Pre-dispute, binding arbitration clauses in pre-hire employment agreements,
or "mandatory arbitration agreements" are generally enforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act.2 By such clauses, the prospective employee agrees to
take future work-related claims to final and binding arbitration and waives the
right to go to court.3 The use of such agreements by employers has increased
dramatically over the past decade, despite strong opposition from advocates for
employees, civil rights groups, and plaintiffs' lawyers.
The percentage of private employers using employment arbitration grew
from 3.6% in 199 14 to 19% in 1997.5 Studies indicate that by 1998, 62% of large
See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (pre-dispute employment arbitration
agreement did not bar the EEOC from bringing suit, where the EEOC acted pursuant to a
charge, and no arbitration or private lawsuit had been initiated); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act covers most
employment agreements); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(holding pre-dispute employment arbitration agreements enforceable under the Federal
Arbitration Act).
2 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109 (mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
agreements generally enforceable under Federal Arbitration Act).
3 Employment arbitration, in contrast to labor arbitrations and employee grievances
brought within the context of a collective bargaining agreement, is a phenomenon of the
non-unionized workforce, as are mandatory arbitration agreements. See generally
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, U.S. Dept. of Labor and U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, Report and Recommendations, GPO-CTLG, L1.2-F 98/2 (1994),
available at http://www.ilr.comell.edu/library/earchive/govreports/dunlop/
DunlopFinalReport.pdf (last accessed Mar. 26, 2003); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.
3d 1465, 1473-79 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing the differences between arbitration in
collective bargaining contexts and in union and non-union contexts).
4 Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being Fair: Remedial Voice
Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. MGMT. 1, 27-42 (1995).
5 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS'
EXPERIENCES WATH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE, GAO/GGD-97-157, 2 (1997), available at
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corporations had used employment arbitration on at least one occasion from 1993
to 1996.6 The employment dispute caseload of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the leading independent provider of private employment
arbitration in the United States, doubled in three years between 1993 and 1996,7
and the number of employees covered by AAA employment arbitration plans
grew from three million in 1997,8 to six million in 2002.9
Employees' advocates, civil rights' advocates, and the plaintiff's bar strongly
oppose the practice. They argue that mandatory (or what I will call
"promulgated"' 0 ) employment arbitration deprives employees of their
constitutional rights to trial and due process, and gives them nothing in return but
a "kangaroo court" dominated by the employers who sponsor it. 11 The debate is
http://www.gao.gov/archive/l997/gg97157.pdf (last accessed Mar. 26,2003) (reporting that
19% of employers surveyed were using arbitration to resolve employment disputes).
6 David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes,
DisP. RESOL. J. Feb. 1999, at 66, 68; see also David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In
Search of Control: The Corporate Embrace ofADR, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 137
(1998).
7 Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 31 (1998) (citing interview with Robert Meade, Senior Vice
President, American Arbitration Association, in New York, N.Y. (May 15, 1998)).
8 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES I (effective June 1, 1997) [hereinafter "AAA's 1997 Rules"].
9 Interview with Robert Meade, Senior Vice President, American Arbitration
Association, in New York, N.Y. (Jan. 14, 2002).
10 The term "mandatory agreement" is used to describe employment arbitration
agreements presented to employees by employers prior to a dispute and prior to hiring the
employee, as a condition to hiring the employee. The term "mandatory" implies that the
employee has no real choice but to accept the agreement, due to the superior bargaining
power of the employer. The term "pre-dispute agreement" is used to describe the same
agreements, but lacks the implication that the employee has no choice but to agree to
arbitration. The AAA adopted the term "promulgated agreement" because the AAA takes no
political position on the debate over the legality of the pre-dispute, pre-hire agreement to
employment arbitration, a convention which this Article will follow.
II See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 638 (1996); Reynolds
Holding, Private Justice, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 8,2001, at A 15, available at 2001 WL 3416493;
Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights "Waived" and Lost in the
Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381,403,426 (1996); Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the
Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute
Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 929-30 (2002); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer
Decision andthe Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635,669
(1995); Maltby, supra note 7, at 32-34.
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more than ideological. Opponents of promulgated employment arbitration argue
that it deprives employees of large jury verdicts and the substantial settlements
provoked by them, and hands employees smaller arbitrators' awards instead. 12
The controversy over promulgated arbitration has continued despite an
apparently dispositive ruling in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams: the Court
found employment agreements with promulgated arbitration clauses to be
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. 13 Since that ruling, however, the
Court carved out EEOC lawsuits from the reach of exclusive arbitral jurisdiction
provided in employment arbitration agreements. 14 Moreover, federal legislation
has been introduced with the aim of nullifying promulgated arbitration clauses. 15
And a concerted lobbying effort has been mounted in federal and state
legislatures for legislation which would curtail employment arbitration despite
the ruling in Circuit City. 16
B. The Need for Empirical Data on Employment Arbitration
The debate to date has been long and hard-fought. But it has been waged
virtually without data reflecting actual experience with promulgated employment
arbitration. Both sides of the debate acknowledge that there is virtually no
empirical research available on employment arbitration, and both agree that the
need for information is vital. 17 This empirical study is an effort to meet this need
12 See, e.g., William Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination, DisP.
RESOL. J. Oct.-Dec., 1995, at 40, 44; Maltby, supra note 7, at 47-49.
13 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
14 EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 287 (2002) (holding that a pre-dispute
employment arbitration agreement does not bar the EEOC from bringing suit, where the
EEOC acts pursuant to a charge, and no arbitration or private lawsuit has yet been initiated).
15 S. 2435, 107th Cong. § 3(a) (2002) and H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. § 3(a) (2001) (both
stating, "[any clause of any agreement between an employer and an employee that requires
arbitration of a dispute arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States shall not
be enforceable").
16 For example, effective July 1, 2002, California legislation requires substantially
increased disclosure by arbitrators. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE. § § 1281.85 & 1281.9 (West 2002).
417 See Lisa B. Bingham & Denise R. Chachere, Dispute Resolution in Employment: The
Need for Research, in EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND WORKER RIGHTS IN THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE 95 (Adrienne E. Eaton & Jeffrey H. Keefe eds., 1999); see Samuel
Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-dispute Employment
Arbitration Agreements, 16 01110 ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL., 559, 564 (2001); David Lewin,
Dispute Resolution in Nonunion Organizations: Key Empirical Findings, in ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
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for data.
This article reports the results of a comprehensive empirical study of 200
AAA Employment Dispute Awards rendered in 1999 and 2000.18 The study
includes 20 charts representing statistical analyses of the sample, as well as
additional analyses and data not reduced to chart form. 19 In short, the instant
article provides a comprehensive statistical account of what actually transpires
during employment arbitration proceedings conducted under the auspices of the
AAA.
C. The Particular Need for Empirical Data on the Experience of
Middle and Lower Income Employees in Employment Arbitration
Studies to date indicate that only highly-compensated employees are able to
gain access to the court systems for their employment-related claims. If
employees with middle and lower incomes are effectively foreclosed from the
courts, then their access to and experience with employment arbitration gain in
importance, as arbitration may be the sole forum for their employment-related
claims. There is therefore a particular need for data on these subjects.
1. Middle and Lower Income Employees Do Not Have Access to
the Courts
The United States Department of Labor and Commerce Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management .Relations, better known as "the Dunlop
Commission," found that mostly highly-compensated employees pursue
employment discrimination claims in the courts.20 A recent survey by William
Howard of plaintiffs lawyers' standards for accepting employment
UNIVERSITY'S 53RD ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR (S. Estreicher, ed., forthcoming 2003)
[hereinafter "Lewin, Nonunion Organizations"]; Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research at the
Crossroads, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 71, 78.
18 The awards were rendered pursuant to the AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (effective Jan. 1, 1999)
[hereinafter the "AAA's 1999 Rules"].
19 This study was unusual as a statistical study because it was undertaken without a
hypothesis. Most statistical studies are undertaken to confirm a hypothesis, as were all of the
prior empirical studies of employment arbitration. The result is an answer to the question
posed, but not a view of the data sample as a whole. The method here was to describe the
sample statistically, with as many analyses as possible.
20 Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, supra note 3, at 50.
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discrimination cases shows that it is probable that only highly-compensated
employees pursue employment discrimination claims in court.21 The same survey
indicates that it is probable that only highly-compensated employees pursue all
other employment-related claims in the courts, as well. 22
This survey of 321 plaintiffs attorneys found that these lawyers accepted
only 5% of the employment discrimination cases offered to them by prospective
plaintiffs. 23 The results of the survey also described the minimum parameters of
an acceptable employment discrimination case.24 Lawyers required, on average,
provable damages of $60,000 to $65,000, a retainer of $3,000 to $3,600, and a
35% contingency fee. 25
Other employment-related claims would be less attractive to the plaintiff's
bar. The minimum parameters would be higher for non-discrimination cases
because discrimination statutes typically provide for an award of the plaintiff s
attorney's fees to plaintiff s counsel in the event that the plaintiff wins the case.
Thus, an employment discrimination case intrinsically offers plaintiff s attorneys
greater rewards. Since "provable damages" in an employment-related case are
correlated with salary, higher minimum provable damages usually require
plaintiffs of higher income. Thus, employees in court with employment-related
cases other than employment discrimination cases are likely to be highly-
compensated employees. 26
21 Howard, supra note 12, at 43-44.
22 Id. Another empirical study tends to confirm that the majority of plaintiffs in
employment-related litigations are highly compensated employees. The study shows that
managers receive the majority of compensation awarded in wrongful discharge cases. See
David J. Jung & Richard Harkness, Life After Foley: The Bottom Line, 5 LAB. LAW. 667,678
(1989).
23 Howard, supra note 12, at 44.
24 Id. Howard's survey of 321 "plaintiff s side" lawyers showed that the lawyers' mean
and median rate of accepting proffered employment discrimination suits for litigation in
court is 5%. In other words, on average, plaintiff's lawyers accept one out of every 20
employment discrimination matters for which employees ask for representation in court. Id.
25 Id.
26 Even assuming that the fee shifting provisions of the employment discrimination
statutes did not increase the minimum parameters of an acceptable employment-related case,
there is no reason to believe that the parameters would be less than those for employment
discrimination cases. The conclusion again, is that highly-compensated employees are in
court with the majority of employment-related claims. Moreover, the EEOC does not
substantially alter the situation-it prosecutes only a very small percentage of charges filed
with it. In 1994, for example, the EEOC prosecuted only .47% of the charges filed with it.
Id. at 47 (stating that the EEOC, with a backlog of almost 97,000 cases, filed only 428
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2. Objectives of the Instant Study
By all indications, employment arbitration is the primary venue for the
claims of middle and lower income employees. Therefore, the cost of the forum
to these employees and the due process that it affords them should be evaluated
separately from an analysis of the attractiveness of the forum to all other
claimants. This study makes that analysis.
While it is a widely-held belief that arbitration is affordable, there has been
no empirical data confirming that belief.27 Accordingly, this study systematically
assesses the precise cost of arbitration to middle and lower income employees.
In addition, this study provides data which address criticisms leveled by
employee and civil rights advocates regarding the failure of employment
arbitration to satisfy the requirements of due process. Thus, this study evaluates,
and tends to refute, the beliefs that: (1) employment arbitration cannot
competently resolve statutory employment discrimination claims; (2) employer-
sponsored arbitration is biased in favor of highly-compensated employees; 28 and
(3) employer-sponsored arbitration is biased in favor of employers.
Indeed, the data here do not even support the theory that the "repeat player
effect" is a failure of due process. The "repeat player effect" is the only
empirically proven theory of alleged failure of due process in employment
arbitration. The empirically proven fact upon which the theory is based is that
employers who arbitrate frequently win arbitrations more often that those that
arbitrate only once. 29
D. The Need for Empirical Data on Employees Arbitrating Pursuant to
"Mandatory, " or Promulgated, Arbitration Agreements
As discussed above, there is vigorous opposition to "mandatory," or
promulgated, arbitration agreements which are presented to the employee as a
lawsuits in 1994).
27 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, supra note 17, at 564-65; Bingham & Chachere, supra
note 17, at 41; Maltby, supra note 7, at 53-55 (all reflecting the belief that arbitration is
affordable for employees); id. at 54 (there is no systematic data on the cost of arbitration to
employees).
28 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, I
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP.. POL'Y J. 189, 213-14 (1997) [hereinafter "Bingham, The Repeat
Player Effect"].
29 See infra Part II for past research regarding the repeat player effect. See infra Part
IV.B.3. for findings regarding the repeat player effect in the instant research.
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precondition to hiring. 30 The opposition focuses on the employee's loss of the
right to trial.31 If, indeed, employees are forced into arbitration, it is critical to
assess the value of the rights lost and the value of the rights forced upon them.
The instant study analyzed whether employees arbitrating pursuant to
promulgated agreements were giving up any real, practical right of access to the
courts. And it further evaluated the accessibility of employment arbitration to
these employees and the due process that was available to them in arbitration.
These analyses are critical to an understanding of the nature of the "mandatory"
employment agreement and "mandatory" employment arbitration.
I used the designation for employees who arbitrated pursuant to promulgated
agreements, "P employees," as a proxy for middle and lower income employees.
Accordingly, the analyses herein are one and the same for those employees who
arbitrated pursuant to promulgated agreements and those employees of middle to
lower income. I used this "P employees" proxy for middle and lower income
employees because I determined that the majority of P employees were of middle
and lower income. 32 Accordingly, the analyses regarding middle and lower
income employees must be read with an eye toward understanding "mandatory"
arbitration as well as potential prejudice toward employees of middle and lower
income.
II. PRIOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Lisa Bingham of Indiana University has done five empirical studies of
employment arbitration under AAA rules. Bingham's first study was based on a
sample of 1992 cases governed by the AAA Commercial Rules which then
governed employment disputes. 33 Bingham found that employees won 64% of
the cases.34 Bingham's second study was based on a sample of cases decided in
30 See, e.g., Maltby, supra note 7, at 36-37 (reporting that the practice of making
employment conditional on assent to an arbitration clause has been condemned bythe Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the American Civil Liberties Union, and National
Employment Lawyers' Association); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of
Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENY. U. L. REv.
1017, 1046-47 (1996).
31 Maltby, supra note 7, at 37; Van Wezel Stone, supra note 30, at 1048.
32 See infra Part IV.A. 1. for more detail on this determination.
33 Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes?
An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995)
[hereinafter "Bingham, Is There a Bias?"].
34 Id. at 378.
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1992 under the Commercial Rules and in 1993 under the AAA's newly adopted'!
Employment Dispute Resolution Rules (the "Employment Rules") governing:
employment dispute cases. 35 Bingham found no statistically significant,
differences in the outcomes of employment dispute cases decided before and
after the AAA's adoption of the new Employment Rules. 36
Bingham's third study, based on cases decided in 1993 and 1994 under both
the Commercial and Employment Rules, provided statistical support for the
"repeat player effect" theory.37 The theory is that employers who arbitrate more
than once, "repeat players," enjoy better results than employers who arbitrate just
once.38 The article also proposed possible explanations for the "repeat player
effect," but did not empirically prove the proposed causes. 39 Nevertheless, one
proposed explanation, the "repeat arbitrator" theory, has come to enjoy the status
of fact in the legal community.40 The "repeat arbitrator" theory holds that repeat
players repeatedly select favorite arbitrators, who then return the favor with
biased decisions in favor of the repeat players. 41
The "repeat player effect," as explained by the "repeat arbitrator" theory,
raises the specter of a "kangaroo court," dominated by an old boys' club of
employers and puppet arbitrators. Bingham undertook, in two studies, one in
199842 and one in 2000,4 3 to prove empirically the "repeat arbitrator" theory, but
35 Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A
Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108 (1996) [hereinafter "Bingham, Emerging Due
Process Concerns"].
36 Id. at 114.
37 Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28, at 206, 213.
38 Id. at 203-04 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SoC'Y REV. 95 (1974)).
39 Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28, at 213.
40 See, e.g., Maltby, supra note 7, at 33.
One of the great dangers to employee-plaintiffs is the "repeat player
syndrome.". . . The employer.., is likely to be a repeat player, with the
opportunity to reject arbitrators whose previous rulings displeased it. The
arbitrator thus has afinancial incentive to rule in favor ofthe employer. Professor
Lisa Bingham of Indiana University recently examined the results of employment
arbitrations in which the employer was a repeat player, and found that employees
fared very poorly in such situations.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
41 Id.; Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28, at 214.
42 Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics
in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998)
[hereinafter "Bingham, On Repeat Players"].
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was not successful. 44
Bingham's third, 1997, study also found that employees earning more than
$40,000 annually have better win rates and outcomes than employees earning
less than $40,000 annually.45 ("Outcome" is defined by Bingham as the amount
of damages awarded divided by the amount of damages demanded.) The finding
is limited because the Employment Rules have been substantially redrafted since
the cases in the 1997 study were decided in 1993 and 1994.46 The findings as to
economic class distribution and win rates are further limited because the sample
included only cases with demands for damages in specific dollar amounts. 47
Roughly half of any sample of AAA claims would lack demands in specific
dollar amounts.48
Bingham's fourth, 1998, study, based on cases decided in 1993 through
43 Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of Employment:
Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed., forthcoming 2003)
[hereinafter the "2000 Study"].
44 Bingham states in her 2000 study that her 1998 study "found that a repeat player
employer's success was related to the underlying factor[] of the ... repeat use of a single
arbitrator." Id. (manuscript at 10, on file with author). This statement is contradicted by the
1998 study itself. Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 42, at 224,238. First, in the 1998
study she expressly included this proposition as one of her three hypotheses. But she did not
include it as one of her two findings because the data did not support it. Id. at 224, 238.
Second, Bingham's express finding as to the "repeat arbitrator" variable was that it was
subsumed in the "Personnel Manual" variable. Id. at 238-39 ("Employees lose more
frequently when the arbitrator is [a repeat arbitrator] .... However, these patterns largely
correspond with differences in the nature of the basis for arbitration.... [i.e.] employees
more frequently lose cases stemming from ... [a personnel] manual."). Ultimately, it was the
"Personnel Manual" variable only which she found to be linked to repeat player success. Id.
at 224, 238. Regarding the 2000 study, see Bingham, 2000 Study, supra note 43 ("the
'Repeat Arbitrator'[variable] was not ... statistically significant" in increasing the chances
of employer success).
45 Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28, at 207, 211-12.
46 The AAA adopted the 1997 Rules in order to implement the Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment
Relationship. See infra this section for more about these the 1997 Rules.
47 Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28, at 206-13 (Note Tables: all
five analyses exclude cases lacking demands for monetary damages).
48 Roughly half of AAA Demands for Arbitration do not include a stated amount of
damages demanded. Interview with Robert Meade, supra note 9. For example, 44.5% of the
cases in this sample (89 of 200 cases) lack a demand for specific monetary damages
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1995 under the Employment Rules, "finds ... that employers arbitrating
pursuant to a personnel manual do better than those arbitrating under an
individual contract." 49
Bingham's fifth study, done in 2000, was based on cases decided between
1993 and 1997, both before and after the AAA's adoption of its new National
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, adopted in June 1997.50 The
AAA's 1997 Rules were drafted to implement the Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment
Relationship. 51 Bingham found that employer success decreased by 20% in the
cases decided after the effective date of the AAA's 1997 Rules. 52 The conclusion
is limited, as only 59 cases in the 265 case sample were adjudicated under the
new rules. 53
William Howard, in his 1995 article, Arbitrating Claims of Employment
Discrimination, compares litigation, AAA arbitration, and arbitration in the
securities industry. 54 The comparisons are somewhat limited by differences in the
types of claims in the sample pools.
Howard compares the win rates and award amounts of plaintiffs in federal
court cases terminated between 1992 and 1994, claimants in New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
arbitrations terminated during the same period, and claimants in AAA
arbitrations terminated between 1993 and 1994.55 While the comparison between
the NASD/NYSE arbitrations and the federal litigations has validity, it is
difficult to draw any meaningful comparison between these three venues and the
AAA. The NASD and NYSE arbitrations and the federal court cases consist
49 Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 42, at 224 (emphasis added).
50 Bingham, 2000 Study, supra note 43.
51 The "Due Process Protocol" was created by a task force composed of individuals
representing management, labor, civil rights organizations, administrative agencies, and the
AAA. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 3-4 (effective Jan. 1,2001). It has been endorsed by the AAA, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Bar Association's Labor & Employment
Section, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of
Arbitrators, and the National Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution. AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTES 3-4 (effective Jan. 1, 2001); Bingham & Chachere, supra note 17, at 110-11;
Maltby, supra note 7, at 39.
52 Bingham, 2000 Study, supra note 43.
53 Id.
54 Howard, supra note 12.
55 Id. at 41-42.
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solely of claims of employment discrimination. 56 The AAA arbitrations,
however, are of all employment-related case types. 57 Hence, Howard was
comparing two different pools of cases that are not comparable: one consisting of
just employment discrimination cases, and the other of every type of
employment-related claim.
There is an additional factor which renders the comparison still less
probative. Howard cites the Dunlop Commission's Report for its 1994 finding
that the majority of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are "managers
and professionals rather than lower-level workers." 58 Similarly, NASD
employment arbitration is restricted to claimants who are relatively highly-
compensated industry professionals. 59 NASD employment arbitration is available
only to the "associated persons" of its members.60 Associated persons are defined
under NASD rules as persons engaged in the investment banking or securities
business at a management or executive level.61 In other words, they are
uniformly financial professionals. Due to the number of NASD claims, this pool
of claims is dominated by highly-compensated employees.
In contrast to federal plaintiffs and NASD/NYSE claimants, the employee-
claimants in AAA arbitrations come from every economic background; therefore
the claimants in the pool of AAA cases are not comparable to those in the
NASD/NYSE pool or the federal case pool. 62 This factor additionally hampers
the comparison between the AAA statistics and those of the NASD/NYSE
arbitrations and the federal litigations.
Howard's comparison of NASD/NYSE arbitration results and federal
litigation results remains a valid comparison of litigation and arbitration by
highly compensated employees of employment discrimination claims only. Here,
56 Id.
57 ld. at 43.
58 Id. at 46 (citing the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations,
U.S. Dept. of Labor and U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Report and Recommendations, GPO-
CTLG, L1.2-F 98/2 (1994)).
59 Arbitration of employment-related claims before the NASD is available only to
member firms and "associated persons" of member firms. NASD Code of Arbitration
Procedure (eff. 7/10/01), Provision 10101 "Matters Eligible for Submission," available at
http://www.nasdadr.coin/arb-code/arb-codeasp#10101 (last updated May 1, 2003).
"Associated persons" are exclusively financial professionals. NASD Rules, Rule 101 (b)
Definitions, available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd (last viewed June 19, 2003).
60 NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure, Provision 10101, supra note 59.
61 NASD Rules, Rule 1011 (b) Definitions, supra note 59.
62 See infra Part I.C. 1.
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employees won 28% of non-jury trials, 38% of jury trials, and 48% of
arbitrations. 63 Employees won a mean non-jury verdict of $167,450, a mean jury
verdict of $417,178, and a mean arbitration award of $83,518.64
Alexander Colvin, in his 2001 article, The Relationship Between
Employment Arbitration and Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, studied
the interaction of employers' in-house alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
procedures and their external employment arbitration procedures. 65 He cites
estimates which suggest that more than 50% of nonunion workplaces in the
United States now have some type of formal in-house ADR procedure.66
Colvin conducted a survey in 1998 of 302 workplaces in the
telecommunications industry, of all sizes and variety.67 He found that 16% of the
workplaces had adopted external employment arbitration procedures. 68 Of those
employers which had adopted external arbitration procedures, 64% had also
adopted in-house "workplace dispute resolution procedures." 69 Colvin theorized
that the external employment arbitration played the role of appellate court for the
in-house ADR systems, but he did not collect any data on the interaction between
the internal and external procedures. 70
David Lewin has completed four case studies of in-house, multi-step ADR
programs.71 His studies have focused on employees' decisions to appeal up
through the steps of internal ADR systems. His first study was of three firms with
ADR programs comprised of four steps of internal review. 72 His most recent
study was of a fourth firm with ADR comprised of four steps, where the fourth
63 Howard, supra note 12, at 42-43.
64 Id.
65 Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration and
Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 643 (2001).
66 Id. at 646 (citing Casey Ichniowski & David Lewin, Characteristics of Grievance
Procedures: Evidence from Nonunion, Union and Double-Breasted Business, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH
ASSOCIATION (1988) and Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being Fair:
Remedial Voice Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. MGMT. 27 (1995)).
67 Id. at 648-49.
68 Id. at 649.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 662.
71 David Lewin, Dispute Resolution in the Nonunion Firm, 31 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 465
(1987) [hereinafter "Lewin, Nonunion Firm"]; Lewin, supra note 17.
72 Lewin, Nonunion Firm, supra note 71.
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step was external arbitration. 73
As to all three firms in his first study, Lewin found that 62% of the claims
settled at the first step of ADR, 23% settled at the second step, 11% settled at
step three, and 4% settled at the final step.74 Lewin's findings as to a fourth
corporation with external arbitration as a final step were substantially the same.75
Considering all three firms and all four steps of the internal procedure, the
probability of an employee winning a claim was 53% over all, but the probability
of success increased to almost 60% at the final step. 76 Lewin did not evaluate the
probability of winning at each step in his study of the fourth firm, which had
external arbitration as its final step. In short, Lewin found that the employee win
rate increases at the higher steps of in-house ADR.77
In another recent article on employment arbitration, Michael Delikat and
Morris Kleiner compared 125 trial verdicts in employment discrimination cases
rendered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York between April 1, 1997 and July 31, 2001, with 186 arbitration awards
rendered in employment-related cases during the same time period in
NYSE/NASD arbitration. 78 Kleiner and Delikat compared the statistics
representing the two venues and found significant similarities. 79
Kleiner and Delikat found, for example, that NASD/NYSE claimants
prevailed in 46.2% of their claims, whereas federal plaintiffs prevailed in 33.6%
of their lawsuits. 80 Claimants won an average award of $236,292, and plaintiffs
73 Lewin, Nonunion Organizations, supra note 17.
74 Lewin, Nonunion Firm, supra note 71, at 483.
75 Lewin, Nonunion Organizations, supra note 17.
76 Lewin, Nonunion Firm, supra note 71, at 483.
77 In the instant study, the employee win rate decreases at the higher steps of in-house
ADR. However, the sample in this study is very different from the sample in Lewin's study.
Lewin studied three employers with the final step of ADR in-house. This study includes 51
employers with the final step of ADR external, under the auspices of the AAA.
78 Michael Delikat & Morris Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms for Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in
Litigation?, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (S.
Estreicher ed., forthcoming 2003).
79 The comparison between the venues involves sample pools with different claim
compositions. While the study also supplies data on state and federal jury verdicts rendered
between 1981 and 2001 in the state of California, the data is not categorized in a manner
which permits comparison with the NASD/NYSE statistics.
80 Delikat & Kleiner, supra note 78.
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won an average award of $377,030.81 Claimants won a median award of
$100,000, and plaintiffs won a median award of $95,554.82 Plaintiffs average
attorney's fees were $149,756, and claimant's average fees were $36,282.83 In
short, the study showed similar results for employees in both venues, although
average lawyer's fees in a lawsuit were substantially higher than in arbitration.8 4
These results are favorable for employment arbitration in the securities industry,
however, such arbitration is largely limited to the highly compensated members
of that industry.8 5 There is still a need for additional information evaluating the
experience of a broader range of employees and industries.
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE INSTANT STUDY
A. Description of the Data
Two hundred awards were randomly selected from the total pool of 356
AAA Employment Arbitration Dispute awards initiated during 1999 and 2000
and decided as of November 5, 2000.86 No cases were excluded from those that
were randomly selected. All of these cases involved employment disputes. Of the
200 awards, 83 were rendered in 1999 and 117 were rendered in 2000. Of the
356 total pool, 86 were rendered in 1999 and 270 were rendered in 2000. The
arbitration hearings were held in 35 different states. A panel of three arbitrators,




84 Given that the NASD is accessible solely to highly compensated employees, see
supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text, the fact that NASD results track court results
tends to confirm the prior conclusion that the courts are accessible mainly to highly-
compensated individuals.
85 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
86 The awards were rendered pursuant to the AAA's 1999 Rules. AAA's 1999 RULES,
supra note 18. By error, one case initiated in 1997 and two cases initiated in 1998 were
included in the pool. The three cases were decided in 1999 and 2000. The number of cases
accidentally included in the pool is not sufficient, however, to materially affect the findings
reported in this study.
87 There were 14 challenges to arbitration in federal court. Eight challenges were
brought by employees, and three were brought by employers. The identity of the petitioner is
unclear in the remaining motions. Clearly, all of these challenges failed, as the awards
describing the motions were rendered by AAA arbitrators.
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B. The Object of the Instant Study Was to Comprehensively Describe the
Sample
The object of the study was to describe the sample in a comprehensive
manner, rather than to prove preconceived hypotheses. No data were excluded as
irrelevant to a hypothesis. Instead, data were extracted from the awards and
entered into a computer database according to 84 criteria. 88 The criteria were
created upon review of the awards. Ultimately, some criteria related to too few
awards to be descriptive of the sample as a whole and are not discussed in the
instant article.
C. How Data on the Awards Were Compiled
Cases where the parties submitted a settlement agreement for the imprimatur
of the arbitrator were assessed as a win for whichever party was to receive the
settlement payment. There were three such cases. Where there was a case with an
award on both the claim and counter-claim, the lesser award was subtracted from
the greater, and the winner's award was entered into the database as a victory in
the resulting amount.
Non-monetary equitable awards were assessed separately. Where relief was
granted to the claimant or cross-claimant, the case was assessed as a win for that
party. Where some relief was granted to both parties, the recipient of the greater
relief was recorded as the winner, but the awards were entered for both parties.
There were no cases where the relief granted was of equal weight, causing a
"draw" between the parties. The magnitude of the relief was based on a common
sense assessment of the award.
Similarly, monetary awards which did not state the relief in a specific dollar
amount were assessed separately. An example of such an award would be
"pension benefits calculated pursuant to formula B in the 401(k) Plan," where
the formula is not provided in the text of the award. These claims were assessed
as a general win or loss, without entering a specific amount. Such cases also did
not result in any "draws."
88 See infra Exhibit A.
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IV. RESULTS OF THE INSTANT STUDY
A. The Cost of Employment Arbitration
1. Method of Estimating the Income of Employees
An estimated 43.5% of the employees in this sample earned between
$14,000 and $60,000. The employees will be called "P employees" in the instant
article. These P employees most likely cannot gain access to the court system. As
discussed above, private employment arbitration may be the only adjudicative
forum which they can access as a practical matter.89
The AAA database uses the letters "P" and "N" to differentiate between
those employees who are party to promulgated, or "P," agreements and those
employees who are party to individually negotiated, or "N," agreements with
arbitration clauses in them. I also use the terms "P employee" and "N employee"
in this article with the same meaning. I use these terms as a short-hand for
income level because 72% of the "P employees" in this sample are lower and
middle-income employees who I estimate earned between $14,000 and $60,000
per year. The "N employees" I estimated earned more than $60,000 annually.
I estimated that 81% of P employees earned no more than $80,000 annually
and that 50% of P employees earned between $14,000 and $40,000 annually. I
made these estimates based first on earnings data in the awards. Where there
were no earnings data in the awards, I looked at information in the awards
describing the employee's occupation and compared the employee's occupation
with the occupations and associated salaries listed in the Department of Labor's
Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Employment and Wage Data from the
Occupational Employment Statistics Survey by Occupation, 2000. 90 This survey
covers nearly 80% of all job titles in the United States and supplies the national
mean annual wages for the occupation.
89 See supra Part I.C.
90 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupation Employment and
Wages (Nov. 2002), Table 1: National Employment and Wage Data from the Occupational
Employment Statistics Survey by Occupation, 2000, Mean Annual Wages, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ocwage.tO .htm. It is possible that more than 72% (87 of
121 cases) of the P employees earned between $60,000 to $14,000. There were nine awards
which did not provide sufficient facts to determine earnings or occupation. In 21% (26 of the
121 P cases), however, the P employees earned more than $60,000.
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2. The Cost of Arbitration for Employers and All Employees
If private employment arbitration has become the only accessible
adjudicatory venue for P employees' employment-related complaints, then it is
important to confirm empirically another assumption about employment
arbitration: that it is indeed low cost for those who have limited resources. The
data on AAA employment arbitration do generally confirm this important point.
The following Tables 1 through 3 summarize the amount of: (1) "filing
fees," paid to the AAA; (2) "hearing fees," paid to the AAA for administrative
costs such as the hearing room; and (3) "arbitrator's fees," paid to the arbitrator
for the services of the arbitrator. These fees are paid by all the parties to the
arbitrations in the sample: (1) P employees, (2) N employees, (3) all employees,
and (4) employers. Following Tables 1 through 3, Tables 4 and 5 present awards
of attorneys' fees to all parties and awards of attorney's fees to P employees
alone, respectively.
An award of attorney's fees to a party means that the arbitrator has ordered
that the party's attorney's fees will be paid by the opposing party. The size of the
award indicates the cost of attorney's fees to the party receiving the award. I have
presented the data on awards of attorney's fees here as evidence of the cost of
attorney's fees to the party receiving the award, not as evidence of how
frequently that party obtained an order that the opposing party pay their legal
costs.
It is important to note that the word "award" has a meaning in the context of
Tables 1, 2, and 3 different from its meaning in Tables 4 and 5. An award in
Tables 1, 2, and 3 is a decision in which an arbitrator has ordered the party to pay
some or all of the fees at issue. The tables indicate the amounts of the fees paid
by these parties. The meaning of "Award" in this context is the opposite of the
meaning of "Award" in Tables 4 and 5.
In Tables 4 and 5, an award is a decision in which an arbitrator has
"awarded" attorney's fees to the party. The award in this context indicates that
the opposing party has been ordered by the arbitrator to pay the fees of the party
shown on the table. The tables are used to show the amounts of attorney's fees
accrued by those parties.
Finally, Table 6, "Cost of Arbitration to P Employees," summarizes the
allocation of fees among the 121 P employees in the sample. Each column shows
the number and percentage of P employees in the sample required to pay
different portions of the four possible fees (filing fees, hearing fees, arbitrator's
fees, and attorney's fees) for arbitration. Then it shows the average value of the
different portions of fees by referring to the average amounts of fees for P
employees shown in Tables I though 3 and the median P attorney's fee shown in
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Table 4. In this way, Table 6 gives an estimate of what each percentage group of
P employees would pay for arbitration which is based, not on the average fees
paid by the employees in that percentage group, but on the average fees paid by
all P employees who paid those fees, or, in the case of attorney's fees, based on
all awards of attorney's fees to P employees in the sample. There is no further
information available regarding the cost of attorney's fees for P employees. For
brevity, Table 6 uses the term "forum fees" to encompass the filing fees, the
hearing fees, and the arbitrator's fees.
Tables 1 through 6 follow.
Table 1. Amount of AAA Filing Fees* Paid by Party
All
Party EE-P EE-N All EEs All ERs AiParties
No. of Awards 42 47 89 111 200
Low Award $150 $250 $150 $0 $0
Median Award $375 $1,000 $500 $500 $500
High Award $750 $7,000 $7,000 $9,514 $9,514
Mean Award $376 $1,446 $941 $1,099 $1,028
Std. $1,44.08 $1,556.28 $1,250.73 $1,459.54 $1,369.48
Deviation** I II
* A very small number offllingfees were awardedfor both parties to share,
not equally, but in specified percentages, such as 25% to the employee and 75%
to the employer. These fees were assessed to the parties and recorded as if
shared equally, in order to prevent needless complication of this Table and other
tables reportingfilingfees.
** The "Standard Deviation" is a number which indicates the degree to
which the numbers in the group are dispersed from the mean. Literally, it is the
square root of the arithmetic average of the square of the deviations from the
mean.
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Table 2. Amount of AAA Hearing Fees Paid by Party
All
Party EE-P EE-N All EEs All ERs AiParties
No. of Awards 36 51 87 113 200
Low Award $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Median Award $150 $450 $300 $355 $300
High Award $783 $4,100 $4,100 $2,700 $4,100
Mean Award $210 $681 $486 $575 $537
Std. Deviation $170.09 $783.938 $650.73 $549.92 $595.948
Table 3. Amount of Arbitrator's Fees Paid by Party
All
Party EE-P EE-N All EEs All ERs AiParties
No. of Awards 35 48 83 117 200
Low Award $0 $219 $0 $0 $0
Median Award $1,500 $2,028 $1,702 $3,841 $2,712
High Award $4,827 $26,708 $26,708 $24,218 $26,708
Mean Award $1,706 $3,843 $2,942 $5,022 $4,159
Std. Deviation $1,075.60 $4,561.90 $3,679.06 $4,300.76 $4,173.108
Table 4. Amount of Attorneys' Fees Awards*
Party EE-P EE-N All EEs All ERs All Parties
No. of 12 16 28 11 39
Awards
Low Award $2,713 $4,590 $2,713 $1,546 $1,546
Median $6,248 $22,126 $14,173 $10,000 $12,575
Award
High Award $54,192 $300,296 $300,296 $98,000 $300,296
Mean Award $14,464 $62,734 $42,047 $23,823 $36,907
Std. Deviation $16,551.96 $85,187.85 $68,811.47 $29,474.16 $60,514.40
*This data represents all of the AAA's information regarding the cost of
legal representation to the parties, except eight awards of "reasonable"
attorneys'fees and six demands for specific amounts of fees. The demands
provided little additional information, because seven were granted in the exact
amount requested by seven of the awards above.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The awards of attorney's fees listed in each party's column are awards to that
party of their fees from their adversary. The amount of the awards in each party's
column thus represents the amount of attorney's fees which that party owes, or
has paid, to their counsel for legal services. Accordingly, Table 4 shows the low,
median, high, and mean amounts which each party paid in attorney's fees for
arbitration.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 indicate a mean fee for P employees. The mean P filing fee
is $376. The mean P hearing fee is $210. And the mean P arbitrator's fee is
$1,706. 91 These mean fees are used on Table 6 to represent the value of these
fees to P employees generally. I used the median attorney's fee, rather than the
mean attorney's fee as the representative value of these fees to P employees,
however.
The data underlying Table 4 indicate that the median P attorney's fee,
$6,248, rather than mean P attorney's fee, $14,464, is the representative
attorney's fee for P employees. There were only 39 awards of a specific monetary
amount of attorney's fees in this sample of 200 awards, 92 but the awards indicate
that P employees paid significantly less than employers or N employees for legal
fees. Table 5, below, shows each of the 12 fee awards to P employees. The data
suggests that the median, $6,248, rather than the mean, $14,464, attorney's fee is
the more accurate representative fee for P employees.
91 These three fees are combined under the heading "Forum Fees" in Table 6. The mean
value of Forum Fees is $2,292, as shown in Table 6, Column 4. Tables I and 2 also show the
maximum amount of P filing and hearing fees, $750 and $783, respectively. The maximum
amount of filing or hearing fees, $783, is reflected on Table 6, Column 2.
92 There are two characteristics of this sample which adversely affect the number of
awards of attorney's fees. First, 20% of the cases in the sample were prosecuted pro se; and
second, only 7% of the cases in the sample were bonafide civil rights claims, supported by
allegations of fact, with the attendant statutory entitlement to attorney's fees. As a result,
there was no possibility of an award in 20% of the sample, and there were only three awards
of attorney's fees pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000).
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Table 5 confirms that the mean attorney's fee, $14,464, may not be the most
representative fee. The three highest awards range from $32,578 to $54,192. The
lowest of them, $32,578, is $20,000 higher than the highest of the first nine fees,
which is only $12,575. The mean fee, $14,464, exceeds the fourth highest fee,
$12,575, and exceeds the median fee of $6,248 by $8,216. For these reasons, the
median "P" legal fee, $6,248, was used as best representing the "Atty Fees" in
Table 6, "Cost of Arbitration to P Employees." This figure, like the average
figure, however, is not derived from a sufficient number of awards of attorney's
fees to be conclusively representative of P employee's attorney's fees in
employment arbitration.
3. The Cost of Employment Arbitration for P Employees
Table 6, "Cost of Arbitration to P Employees," below, shows the number
and percentage of P employees in the sample who paid each designated part of
the possible four fees (filing fees, hearing fees, arbitrator's fees, and attorney's
fees) for AAA employment arbitration. The term "forum fees" is used to refer to
filing, hearing, and arbitrator's fees on the chart. Each part of the possible fees
paid by a P employee is described at the top of Columns 1 through 9. For
example, the heading of Column 6 is "Atty Fees & 2 Arb. Fees." This heading
indicates that there is a group of P employees who paid only their own attorney's
fees and one half of the arbitrator's fees for arbitration. Looking at the rows on
the right hand side of the table, under "Total Cases," and tracing that row over to
Column 6, there is a number four under Column 6, indicating that there were
four cases in which P employees paid attorney's fees and half of arbitrator's fees
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for arbitration.
Secondly, Table 6 shows the average cost of the portion of fees which each
designated group of P employees paid. Still looking at column six, there are four
P employees who paid their own attorney's fees and half of the arbitrator's fees
for arbitration. The heading of Column 7, under the description of the portion of
fees paid, states, "($7,394)." This figure is the median P attorney's fees based on
all awards of attorney's fees to P employees in this sample, plus 50% of the mean
P filing fees, hearing fees, and arbitrators fees based on all awards in this sample.
In other words, Table 6 provides the average value of the portion of fees which
each group of P employees paid, based on P data from the whole sample.
Approximately one third of P employees proceeded pro se.93 Accordingly,
Table 6 provides the number of cases involving P employees who pay each
possible portion of the four possible fees, the percentage of the total of 121 P
cases comprised by that number of cases, and the number of those cases where
the P employees proceeded with and without counsel. Specifically, the rows
down the right hand side of Table 6 provide: (1) "Total Cases," i.e., the total
number of cases involving P employees who paid one of the nine different
designated portions of the four possible fees; (2) "% of 121 P Cases," i.e., the
percentage of the 121 total cases involving P employees comprised by the
number of cases where P employees paid this designated portion of fees; (3)
"Cases w/Atty," i.e., the number of the cases where the P employee paid this
designated portion of fees and was represented by counsel; and (4) the number of
the cases where the P employee paid this designated portion of fees and
proceeded pro se.
93 One third of the "P cases" were prosecuted pro se. It might be argued that the pro se
cases should be excluded from the evaluation of attorney's fees because the pro se parties'
inability to pay for counsel should not be interpreted as inexpensive attorney's fees. The
problem with this argument is the presumption that the decision to proceed pro se arises
from an inability to pay counsel. The available data indicate that P employees pro se do as
well as those with counsel, and that P employees choose to hire counsel when a larger
amount of money or equitable relief is at stake. See infra Part IV.C.4.
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Summarizing the statistics reflected in Table 6,94 the following are my
findings as to the cost of AAA arbitration for P employees during 1999 and
2000.
The potential costs of AAA arbitration during 1999 and 2000 were the filing
fee, hearing fees, the arbitrator's fees, and attorney's fees. I refer to the filing,
hearing and arbitrator's fees, collectively, as "forum fees" because they comprise
the cost of the arbitration forum, whereas attorney's fees are the cost of counsel.
I found that 32% of P employees paid nothing for arbitration. This group of
employees paid no forum fees because the arbitrator reallocated their fees to the
employer at the end of the arbitration hearing. They paid no attorney's fees
because they proceeded pro se, or because they were awarded attorney's fees by
the arbitrator.
Twenty-nine percent of P employees paid only attorney's fees for arbitration.
All of their forum fees were reallocated to the employer by the arbitrator. The
average attorney's fee, based on all 200 cases, was $6,776. This figure is the best
estimate of their cost of arbitration. This figure needs further research, however,
as there were only 12 awards of attorney's fees to P employees in the 200 case
sample.
Considering the 32% group and 29% group above, we can see that both
groups' forum fees were entirely re-allocated to the employer. Thus, a total of
61% of P employees paid no forum-fees. The 32% group did not then pay for
counsel, while the 29% group did pay for counsel.
An additional 13% of P employees paid no attorney's fees, but did pay some
or all of the forum fees in the case. In order to estimate the cost of arbitration to
these employees, I calculated the average amounts of the filing, hearing and
arbitrator's fees based on all 200 cases. The total of these average fees was
$2,292. This is a good estimate of the most that this 13% of P employees paid for
94 The D.C. Circuit has ruled that for a promulgated private employment arbitration
agreement to be enforceable, the employer must pay the arbitrator's fees. Cole v. Burns Int'l
Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 at 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This case concerned a Title VII claim
under the AAA Employment Dispute Resolution Rules which provide that the parties shall
share the arbitrator's fees equally. Such a rule would reduce 28.9% of the P employees' costs
by $853 (2 mean arbitrator's fees), and 4% of P employees' costs by $1,706 (mean
arbitrator's fees). More recently, however, the D.C. Circuit trimmed this holding to extend
only to claims arising from federal statutory claims. Brown v. Wheat First Securities Inc.,
257 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 2001). To date, only the more liberal Ninth Circuit is invoking the
original holding of Cole. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.
2002) (promulgated arbitration agreement unconscionable in part due to employee's required
share of arbitrator's fees).
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arbitration.
The final 26% of P employees paid all of their attorney's fees, as well as
some or all of the forum fees for the case. Only 2% of this 26% group paid all of
their forum fees, while the remaining 24% paid only a part of their forum fees.
For the 2% group, the total cost of arbitration was $8,540, based on the average
attorney's fees and forum fees for the 200 case sample. For the remaining 24%,
the average cost of arbitration was between $6,776 and $7,954.
Based on these figures, 55% of lower-income employees had average total
arbitration costs between $6,776 and $8,540. This 55% is comprised of the 29%
and 26% groups above.
4. AAA Employment Arbitration Is Generally Affordable for P
Employees
Seventy-two percent of P employees earned between $14,000 and $60,000.
Fifty percent of the P employees earned between $14,000 and $40,000. 95 Based
on the figures in Table 6, 55% of P employees had average total arbitration costs
between $6,776 and $8,540. Nevertheless, the costs of arbitration appear to be
affordable to employees earning less than $60,000 per year, assuming that they
have been working during the pendency of the arbitration. These arbitration costs
are affordable because most P employees have agreed to representation on a
contingency basis. Thus, attorney's fees should generally be affordable to P
employees. The remaining costs of arbitration, forum fees, average only $2,292.
Presumably, even P employees can afford to pay them.96
B. Promulgated Agreements, the Right to Trial and the Cost of
Arbitration
As previously discussed, perhaps the main objection of employee advocates,
civil rights groups, and the plaintiff's bar to employment arbitration is the use of
promulgated agreements by employers. 97 The objection is that employers use
95 See infra Part IV.A.I.
96 Effective November 1, 2002, the AAA amended its rules to limit employee's forum
fees to a total of $125.00, virtually eliminating any question regarding the affordability of
AAA employment arbitration. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION AsSOCIATION, NATIONALRULES
FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (effective Nov. 1, 2002). The foregoing
analysis remains probative of the affordability and fairness of AAA employment arbitration
prior to 2003.
97 See supra Part I.D.
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superior economic power to force employees to relinquish their right to trial in
exchange for arbitration as a precondition to employment. 98 This argument has
assumed, however, that employees had the real choice of taking their
employment-related claims to court prior to signing the promulgated agreements.
This study indicates that the majority of employees do not have that choice. They
have no real right to trial. As demonstrated above, 72% of the employees in this
sample who arbitrated pursuant to promulgated agreements were of low to
middle income and did not earn enough income to gain access to the courts with
an employment-related claim.
Assuming that the argument of employee and civil rights advocates is true:
that employees who arbitrated pursuant to promulgated agreements were forced
to arbitrate under the auspices of the AAA, it is important to determine whether
AAA employment arbitration was affordable to these employees. This study does
indicate that AAA employment arbitration is affordable to the employees who
were allegedly forced to arbitrate under its auspices.
C. AAA Employment Arbitration and Due Process
1. Statutory Employment Discrimination Cases: A Red Herring
Statutory employment discrimination claims have been at the center of the
debate over the propriety of promulgated employment arbitration. 99 The
emphasis on civil rights cases may be inappropriate. Employment discrimination
claims comprise only a small percentage of AAA's employment-related claims.
They have comprised between 1.8% and 7% of the samples in studies of AAA
employment arbitration done to date. 100 Nor are substantial numbers of civil
rights claims filed with the NYSE or NASD. An average of no more than 21
employment discrimination claims were filed per year with the NYSE and
98 See id.
99 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Howard,
supra note 12; Maltby, supra note 7.
100 Only 1.8% of the claims from a 1993 sample of AAA employment arbitration cases
alleged employment discrimination. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns, supra note
35, at 115. Only 13 of all the AAA cases filed in 1996 alleged employment discrimination.
Maltby, supra note 7, at 49-50. Just 7% of the claims from this sample of AAA cases (or 14
of 200 cases) decided in 1999 and 2000 alleged employment discrimination. As to this
sample, it should be noted that 36 cases alleged a civil rights claim, but 19 did so without
alleging a single fact in support of the claim and three were time barred. These claims were
not included in the 14 claim total.)
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NASD combined, between 1989 and 2001.101 These figures strongly suggest that
the proper evaluation of employment arbitration should not be based, or
primarily focused, on the forum's treatment of civil rights claims.10 2
Civil rights claims comprised only 7% of the instant sample, or 14 cases out
of 200. Findings regarding those 14 cases would concern numbers too small to
be statistically significant. In other words, the findings would not be
representative of the sample or generalizable to AAA employment arbitration
generally. Nevertheless, if one reads these 14 awards, they appear to have been
generally properly adjudicated. There were two dispositive errors of law, but the
majority of arbitrators properly applied the governing statutes and case law. In
the three cases which claimants won, the arbitrators considered all statutory
categories of damages. They awarded attorney's fees against the employer
pursuant to statute, and considered, but ultimately rejected, awarding punitive
damages.
2. There Is No Evidence of Bias Against Employees, Employees of
Middle and Lower Income or Employees Arbitrating Pursuant to
Promulgated Agreements
Two major due process concerns regarding employer-sponsored arbitration
are that its arbitrators will be biased against employees in general or against
middle- and lower-income employees in particular. 103 In prior studies, win/loss
ratios and award/demand ratios have been employed to assess the presence of
arbitrator bias. 104 The ratios for the employers have been compared with the
ratios for the employees, and the inference of arbitrator bias has been drawn from
a significant difference in favor of the employers. 105 The problem with this
method of analysis is that there may be other inferences than arbitrator bias that
101 See Delikat& & Kleiner, supra note 78.
102 It is worth noting that few P employees' civil rights claims proceed through the
award stage in any venue. As discussed above, P employees cannot afford to access the
courts, and the EEOC prosecutes few claims. See supra Part I.C.1. Very few civil rights
claims reach the award stage with AAA or the NYSE over all, meaning that even fewer
awards might be those of P employees. See supra note 100. And the NASD excludes all but
highly compensated employees from its jurisdiction. See supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text.
103 See, e.g, Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28; Bingham, Is There a
Bias?, supra note 33; Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns, supra note 35.
104 Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28, at 204-05.
105 Id.
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can be drawn from the difference between the ratios.
The results of this study pertaining to bias follow below in eight analyses.
The data relevant to bias are the win rates, win/loss ratios, award amounts,
award/demand ratios, and the allocation of filing, hearing, arbitrator's and
attorney's fees by the arbitrator.
a. Win Rates and Win/Loss Ratios
Table 7. Win/Loss Ratios by Party
Percent
Total of Cases Percent Win/Loss
Number Number Involving Number of Cases Ratio
Party of Cases of Cases Party of Cases Involving (cases
Involving Won Won Lost Party won/ cases
Party (Win Lost lost)
Rate)
ER 200 114 57% 86 43% 1.3
(114/86)
EE 200 86 43% 114 57% .75
1 1 (86/114)
EE-P 121 41 34% 80 66% .51
(41/80)
EE-N 79 45 57% 34 43% 1.3
(45/34)
lVol. 18:3 2003]
DUE PROCESS AT LOW COST
Table 8. Win/Loss Ratios in P Employee Sub-sample of Cases
Percent of Win/Loss
Total Cases with
Number of Number of Number of P Parties




Discharge 41 8 33 19.5% .24
Cases
"Appellate
Effect" 25 6 19 24% .32
Cases
Sub-Total 66 14 52 21% .27
Remainder 55 27 28 49% .96
TotalP 121 41 80 34% .51
Cases
Looking at Table 7, at first blush, the win rates and win/loss ratios look
inequitable for employees as compared to employers, and inequitable for P
employees as compared to N employees. Employers have a win rate of 57% and
a win/loss ratio of 1.3, while employees have a win rate of 43% and a win/loss
ratio of .75. N employees have a win rate of 57% and a win/loss ratio of 1.3,
while P employees have a win rate of 34% and a win/loss ratio of 0.51.
These disparities, however, are not the result of arbitrator bias. Table 8
permits closer examination of the nature of the P employees' claims. It shows
that more than half of the claims-66 of 121-are of a type that is inherently
likely to be dismissed, regardless of the predilections of the arbitrator. Table 8
shows that the P cases include 41 of the 42 wrongful discharge claims in the
sample as a whole. Claims of wrongful discharge, absent allegations amounting
to claims of contract or discrimination, are likely to fail because employment at-
will is the law. 106 Table 8 also shows that the P cases also include all 25 cases in
the sample affected by the "appellate effect." These 25 cases are also likely to be
meritless and are likely to be decided against the employee for that reason. 107
The appellate effect is an above-average win rate for an employer, caused
106 At-will employment is no longer the law in Montana. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904
(2001).
107 See infra Part IV.C.3.
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by the effective functioning of the employer's in-house dispute resolution
program. The program isolates and resolves claims with merit in-house,
leaving meritless claims for final appeal to external arbitration with the AAA.
The result is an AAA docket of meritless claims against that company,
virtually all of which end up being dismissed. The cases in this sample that
were subject to the appellate effect had little or no merit. There was no room
for arbitrator prejudice to play a role in their dismissal. 108
Thus, a total of 66 cases, more that 50% of the 21 P cases, are meritless cases
which would be decided against the employee for reasons other than arbitrator
bias, or any other bias inherent in the forum. Table 8 shows that the win rate of
the 55 remaining cases is 49%, and their win/loss ratio is .96. These numbers
compare favorably with the win rate of the N employees and the employers,
57%, and the win/loss ratios of the N employees and the employers, 1.3. The
difference is not sufficient to indicate bias.
Just as the 66 meritless cases exerted a downward effect on the win rate and
win/loss ratio of the P employees, it affected the win rate and win/loss ratio of
the employees over-all, as compared to the employers. See Table 7. The original
comparison between the employers' win rate, 57%, and win /loss ratio, 1.3, and
the employees' win rate, 43%, and win/loss ratio, .75, however, is more
favorable than the original comparison between the N and P employees'
statistics. The improvement in the P sub-sample rendered by eliminating the
meritless cases will improve the win rate and win/loss ratio of the overall
employees' sample, making the relationship between the employees' and
employers' statistics even closer. Accordingly, there is not a sufficient disparity
of win rates or win/loss ratios to indicate systematic bias in favor of the
employer.
This data does not show bias against employees generally, or against
employees of middle or lower income. But "P employee" does not signify only
an employee's income. It also indicates that an employee is arbitrating pursuant
to a promulgated agreement. Accordingly, the data indicate that these employees
are treated fairly.
b. Award Data and Award/Demand Ratios
Claimant-employee success may also be judged by looking at the amount of
the awards rendered, as well as the amount of the award rendered as a percentage
of the amount of damages demanded, a ratio which is sometimes called the
108 The appellate effect is discussed more fully at Part IV.C.
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"outcome." Tables 9 and 10 provide this data.
Table 9. Amounts of Monetary Awards Awarded to Each Party
Prevailing No. of Low Median High Mean Standard
Party Awards Deviation
ER 19 $2,000 $26,780 $357,606 $54,960 $86,017.36
EE 66 $412 $44,855 $1,732,500 $172,690 $336,396.20
EE-P 25 $412 $16,666 $1,320,531 $84,754 $260,344.70
EE-N 41 $1,746 $86,844 $1,732,500 $230,013 $370,293.60
Table 10. EE-P and EE-N Demands, Awards, and Outcomes
Prevailing No. of Low Median High Mean Standard
Party Cases Deviation
EE-Pemad 15 $428 $10,835 $244,275 $50,593 $71,742.70Demands
EE-PAwrd 15 $412 $11,468 $158,603 $29,503 $43,418.77Awards
EE-P
Outcomes 15 .96 1.0 .65 .58
(Awds/dmds)
EE-NDemn 38 $10,000 $170,618 $4,408,500 $505,763 $839,762Demands
EE-NAwrd 38 $1,746 $71,513 $1,732,500 $242,038 $382,155Awards
EE-N
Outcomes 38 .2 .4 .4 .48
(Awds/dmds)
Briefly looking at the simple amounts of the awards alone, N employees had
larger awards than P employees. See Table 9. But N demands for monetary
damages are also much larger than P demands. See Table 10. N demands are
larger because damages in most employment-related claims are based on salary
and N employees earn larger salaries. 109 What matters for purposes of assessing
relative success is that P employees were awarded, on average, 10% more of
109 The award/demand ratio of the monetary awards should also be considered in
context together with a similar comparison of the demands and awards of non-monetary,
equitable relief. A significant portion of the monetary awards, 44.4%, to P employees was
accompanied by non-monetary, equitable relief. The number of demands for this non-
monetary equitable relief were too few, however, to render award/demand ratios of statistical
significance.
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their demands for monetary damages than N employees were awarded, as
indicated in Table 10. The average award/demand ratio for P employees is 58%,
versus 48% for N employees. Thus, the outcome data reveals that P employees
won a larger percentage of their demands than N employees. There can be no
inference of arbitrator bias against P employees, or other breach of due process,
drawn from these facts.
There were insufficient data on employer demands to make comparisons
with employer outcomes. The data from the "Award Amount" table, Table 9,
however, reveal that P employees received a mean award nearly $30,000 more
than the mean award to employers.
There were also too few demands for equitable relief to evaluate outcomes
for equitable awards. But P employees did receive 40% of the total of 35
equitable awards granted.
In conclusion, the award and demand data as a whole does not allow for an
inference of arbitrator bias against P employees, or for an inference of a breach
of due process. If anything, the data would imply some bias in favor of P
employees. 10
c. Allocation of Forum Fees in P Cases
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of AAA arbitrators' positive attitude
toward employees generally, and P employees specifically, is in the prevalence of
awards of the costs of the arbitration itself to the claimants. The AAA's 1999
Rules provide that the AAA filing fee shall be borne by the claimant, who is
usually the employee, and that the AAA's hearing fees and the arbitrator's fees
shall be shared equally by the parties. I"' Pursuant to these same rules, however,
the arbitrator has discretion to reallocate the payment of the fees in a different
manner. The following Tables 11, 12 and 13 reflect the manner in which the
arbitrators in the P cases reallocated arbitrator's fees, hearing fees, and filing
fees, respectively, between employers and P employees.
110 P employees, it should be remembered, are both middle- and lower-income
employees and employees in arbitration pursuant to promulgated agreements.
IIl AAA 1999 Rules, Rule 39. In just a handful of cases, allocation of fees was altered
by the procedural rules of the employer's ADR plan.
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Table 11. Reallocation of Arbitrator's Fees in P Cases Won and Lost
Number of Cases Frequency ofNumbe of asesArbitrator's
Total Where ER Pays ritator's
Cases EE's 50% share Reallocation of Fees("reallocated cases") (reallocated cases as
% of total cases)
Total P Cases with 121 85 70.247%
Arbitrator's Fees
P Cases Won 40 32 80.00%
P Cases Lost 81 53 65.43%
Difference Between
Frequencies of 14.57%
Reallocation of Fees in
Cases Won and Cases Lost
Table 12. Reallocation of Hearing Fees in P Cases Won and Lost
Number of Cases Frequency ofNuer of Cass Arbitrator's
Total Where ER Pays Reallocation ofCss EE's 50% share FeCases ("reallocated Fe
casese) (reallocated cases
as % of total cases)
Total P Cases with 108 77 71.29%
Hearing Fees
Cases Won 37 30 81.08%
Cases Lost 71 47 66.19%
Difference Between
Frequencies of
Reallocation of Fees in 14.89%
Cases Won and Cases
Lost
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Table 13. Reallocation of Filing Fee by P Cases Won and Lost
Number of Cases Frequency of
Where ER Pays Arbitrator's
Total Some or All of Reallocation of
Cases EE's 100% share Fees
("reallocated (reallocated cases
cases") as % of total cases)
Total P Cases with 121 103 85.12%
Filing Fees
Cases Won 40 38 95%
Cases Lost 81 65 80.25%
Difference Between
Frequencies of
Reallocation of Filing 14.74%
Fees in Cases Won and
Cases Lost
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of AAA arbitrators' positive attitude
toward employees generally and P employees specifically is in their award of the
costs of the arbitration itself. AAA employment arbitrators exercised their
discretion to reallocate arbitrator's fees to the employer in 70.25% of the cases,
hearing fees in 71.3% of the cases, and some or all of the filing fees in 85.12% of
the cases. Thus, virtually all forum costs were reallocated to the employer in
70.25% of the cases. 112 Tables 11, 12 and 13 also show that success on the
merits of the case increased the likelihood of reallocation of the fees by 14%.
The two predominant, and conflicting, views on assessing employees fees in
private employment arbitration are (1) that a claim should cost something in
order to prevent frivolous claims; and (2) that a claim should cost nothing, so as
not to discourage the assertion of a viable claim. The data here indicate that AAA
arbitration straddles the two views. The AAA Rules impose fees and an
expectation of costs, while the arbitrators reallocate those fees a majority of the
time, removing the expectation of costs. In any event, the reallocation of fees
indicates an absence of bias against employees.
d. Awards of Attorneys' Fees
The number of demands and awards of attorney's fees are insufficient to
form statistically significant award/demand ratios. Looking at the awards alone,
112 Remember that the mean P employee filing fee is only $376.
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the number of awards of attorney's fees, expressed as a percentage of total
claims, indicate bias against the P employee. P employees received awards of
attorney's fees in 13% of their total claims, N employees in 30% of their total
claims, and employers in 32% of their total claims.
A closer look at the data, however, reveals that the number of awards of
attorney fees should not be evaluated as a percentage of total claims. The
arbitrators overwhelmingly awarded attorney's fees in cases alleging: (1) breach
of contract; (2) violation of statutory civil rights; or (3) violation of other
statutory rights. In other words, attorney's fees were usually awarded only where
the award was contemplated by statute or written contract. Looking at the total
number of awards to each party, as a percentage of the number of statutory and
contract claims made by the party, provides a more accurate assessment of bias.
Table 14 evaluates the arbitrator's awards of attorney's fees to the different
parties as a percentage of the parties' contract claims and statutory employment
discrimination claims.
Table 14. Awards of Attorney's Fees as Percentage of Contract and
Statutory Claims
P-EE N-EE ER
Total Awards of Atty. Fees* 16 20 11
Total Awards of Atty. Fees in Contract
Claims and Statutory Claims
Total Contract and Statutory Claims 64 40 55
Asserted
Total Awards of Atty. Fees in C. and S. 19% 42% 20%
Claims as % of C. and S. Claims
*The awards are to the party under whose column the awards are listed. The
awards are of that party's fees, and against their adversary.
P employees were awarded their attorney's fees in 19% of their contract and
statutory claims. Employers were awarded attorney's fees in 20% of their
contract and statutory claims. N employees were awarded attorney's fees in 42%
of their contract and statutory claims. These results indicate no bias in favor of
employers, but they do seem to indicate a bias in favor of N employees over P
employees.
The disparity between the frequency of P and N awards, however, may have
something to do with the exact breakdown of the types of claims they asserted.
Of the 40 statutory and contract claims which they asserted, N employees
asserted 60% contract claims, whereas only 34% of the 64 statutory and contract
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claims asserted by P employees were contract claims.
3. The Appellate Effect
a. The Repeat Player Effect
As discussed above, however, there is one theory alleging a lack of due
process in employment arbitration which enjoys some empirical support. The
"repeat player effect" is the theory that, in a given sample of cases, an employer
who arbitrates more than once will win more frequently than other employers.' 13
The cause of the repeat player effect has never been established. Yet it is the
cause that determines whether the effect is the symptom of a fair or unfair
process.
The most popular explanation for the effect is that the repeat player employer
chooses the same arbitrator repeatedly and develops a relationship with the
arbitrator which causes the "repeat arbitrator" to become improperly biased in
favor of the employer when deciding the employer's cases. 114 The "repeat
arbitrator" theory essentially conceives of private employment arbitration as a
"kangaroo court." However, the "repeat arbitrator" theory itself has no empirical
support and is not supported by the data in this sample. I 15
b. The Failure of the "Repeat Arbitrator" Theory
In order to test the "repeat arbitrator" theory, I looked at these 200 cases for
any subsequent arbitration involving an employer and an arbitrator who had
previously been involved in the same arbitration. I did not limit the review to
"repeat arbitrators." I also looked for "repeat arbitrations" involving any two
entities present at arbitration. My theory was that a repeat appearance involving
any two entities present at an arbitration might improperly influence the outcome
of an arbitration. It has been proposed, for example, that the real "repeat players"
in arbitration are the lawyers. 116
Out of the 200 cases representing arbitrations decided in 1999 and 2000, the
total number of arbitrations involving a second meeting between any two entities
involved in arbitration-including employers, employees, arbitrators, counsel for
113 See supra Part II.
114 Id.
11' Id.
116 Estreicher, supra note 17, at 566.
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claimant or respondent, and non-lawyer representatives for claimant or
respondent-was two. These two repeat appearances were between employers
and arbitrators. Both times the employer did win the second case. Two, or 1% of
the 200 cases, however, is not a statistically significant incidence in a sample of
200. In other words, there are no empirically cognizable "repeat arbitrators" in
this sample. This study is the third failure of the "repeat arbitrator" theory to
explain the "repeat player effect."l 7
Just as there is no support for the "repeat arbitrator" theory, there is no
support for the idea that employment arbitration sponsored by employers is a
"kangaroo court" dominated by an "old boys' network" of individuals who know
one another, and that arbitrators render prejudiced verdicts for that reason. Nor is
there support for the concept that the arbitrator knows the "repeat players" by
reputation, and is therefore biased in their favor the first time that the arbitrator is
called to arbitrate a dispute involving them. The fact that there are no repeat
player employers, repeat arbitrators, or indeed, repeat participants of any kind in
this sample demonstrates that AAA employment arbitration is characterized by a
wide variety of parties. Moreover, the total number of arbitrators on the AAA
panel in contrast to the annual number of arbitrations shows that it is unlikely
that any individual arbitrator would have appeared with sufficient frequency to
seek to reward "repeat player" employers. There were 560 arbitrators on the
AAA's employment arbitration panel in 1999-2000.118 And there were only 432
awards rendered in 1999 and 410 rendered in 2000.119
The theory of the repeat player effect as explained by the repeat arbitrator
117 Bingham suggests that we expand the sample of cases until we collect a sufficient
number of "repeat arbitrator" cases to test the "repeat arbitrator" theory. Bingham, 2000
Study, supra note 43. The problem with this suggestion is that even when we expand the
sample, the number of "repeat arbitrator" cases that we collect must be statistically
significant as compared to the sample as a whole. This sample strongly suggests that a larger
sample will not produce a statistically significant number of "repeat arbitrator" cases. This
problem is not a mere technicality. Expanding the sample to capture a sufficient number of
"repeat arbitrator" cases to track the behavior of several "repeat arbitrators" poses the
following questions: (1) Given the instant sample's results and the 560 arbitrators on the
AAA employment panel, how far would we have to expand the sample to capture an
adequate number of repeat arbitrators? (2) How long do we suppose the arbitrators' and
employers' memories to be? (3) How many encounters create a bias?
118 The current number of arbitrators on the AAA employment arbitration panel is 610.
In 1999-2000, the number was approximately 560. Interview with Robert Meade, Senior
Vice President, American Arbitration Association, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 9, 2002).
119 This information was provided by the computer database maintained by AAA at its
Headquarters at 335 Madison Ave., New York, NY, 10017
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theory has its roots in labor arbitration-a forum where the participants are, in
fact, repeat players, and the arbitrators are often repeat arbitrators. 120 The
participants in labor arbitrations know one another and expect to arbitrate
together again. "[B]ecause both unions and employers are repeat customers of
arbitration and have a hand in selecting the arbitrator. . . , arbitrators have a
strong personal interest in crafting awards that will be respected as fair by both
parties .... 121 Reputations do not appear to accrue in this manner under the
auspices of AAA employment arbitration, and the data shows that the "repeat
arbitrator theory" does not explain the "repeat player effect" found herein.
c. The Appellate Effect
This study supports an explanation of the repeat player effect which I have
named the "Appellate Effect." Repeat player employers isolate and resolve large
numbers of meritorious employee claims through in-house dispute resolution
programs, leaving only relatively meritless cases for appeal to AAA arbitration.
The result is a AAA docket of meritless cases against that employer, which leads
to an above-average win-rate for that employer. In other words, the repeat player
effect is caused, not by a lack of due process, but by a fair in-house process.
d. Data Supporting the Appellate Effect Theory
Table 15 summarizes the data supporting the Appellate Effect Theory. It
shows the win-loss ratio for all cases in the sample and the win-loss ratios for all
cases in the sample (1) where the employer maintained an in-house dispute
resolution program (DRP), (2) which were subject to the repeat player effect
(RPE), (3) which were subject to both DRP and RPE, in other words, subject to
the Appellate Effect, and (4) which were subject to RPE, but not DRP.
120 See, e.g., Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 28, at 192-93 (citing Cole
v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1476 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
121 Cole, 105 F.3d at 1475.
[Vol. 18:3 20031
DUE PROCESS AT LOW COST
Table 15. The Appellate Effect Data
All Cases All Cases Cases with
Where ER Where ER Appellate Cases with
uses DRP is "Repeat Effect a Repeat All Cases
(cases with Player" (cases with Player
"DRP") (cases with "DRP" and Only
"RPE") "RPE")
Total No. of
Cases 51 34 25 9 200
No. of
Cases Won 35 24 19 5 114
by ER
No. of




Ratio (cases 3.2 1.25 1.3
won/cases
lost)
* "Repeatplayer" arbitrations excludedfirst appearance of "repeatplayer"
employer.
In this study, 34 cases involved a repeat player employer. Eighty-eight
percent of these repeat players were employers with nationally known names,
which are likely to process a relatively large number of cases. 122 The employers
in 74% of those cases (25 cases) maintained an in-house dispute resolution
program (DRP) culminating in AAA arbitration. The win-loss ratio for this 74%
of cases was 3.2, a full 190% higher than the 1.3 win-loss ratio for employers
over-all. On the other hand, the remaining 26% of repeat employer cases (9
cases) involved employers who did not maintain in-house DRPs. Their win-loss
ratio was only 1.25, just slightly below the 1.3 win-loss ratio for employers over-
all. In short, the "repeat player effect" does not exist where the repeat player does
not maintain an in-house DRP. Thus, the "Appellate Effect" appears to be the
result of the selection processes of large employers' in-house DRPs, not merely
the by-product of large employers' repeat appearances at arbitration.
122 A confidentiality agreement covers the release of the instant sample of AAA cases,
and specifies that the names of parties will not be published. Accordingly, it is not possible
to supply the specific names of these large employers.
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The "appellate effect theory" is further confirmed by a reading of the 25
individual cases which do manifest the "repeat player effect." They are indeed, of
little or merit. A reading of these awards reveals that over half, 56%, were
without any merit. 123 An additional 20% had some merit, but were properly
denied. Thus, a total of 76% of the claims fall into the category of no merit or
little merit, supporting the theory that the DRPs of repeat player employers push
cases of questionable merit to the final step of external appellate review under
the auspices of AAA, producing a higher than average rate of dismissal. This
"appellate effect" theory is worth further investigation. 124
4. Proceeding Pro Se
One third of the P cases in this sample were prosecuted pro se, which raises
the question of how well AAA employment arbitration works for apro se litigant
of low to middle income. 125 The data in this sample, however, indicate that pro
se P employees succeed in AAA employment arbitration at the same rate as P
employees with counsel.
123 The majority of these awards review the facts of the claimant's termination.
Accordingly, the author's assessment of the degree of merit in the claim is a common-sense
assessment of the facts recited in the award.
124 Bingham attempts to discredit the Appellate Effect theory in her most recent article.
Bingham, 2000 Study, supra note 43. But she fails to address the data supporting the theory.
She also calls the theory a mere restatement of her "employer learning theory," which is that
repeat player employers learn to settle cases which they expect to lose. But even an
"employer learning theory" explains the "repeat player effect" as the result of companies
settling meritorious claims. Apparently even Bingham no longer clings to the claim that the
"repeat player effect" is proof that arbitration lacks due process.
125 P employees proceeded pro se in 33% of their cases, whereas N employees
proceeded pro se in only 5.1% of their cases, and employers in only 4% of their cases.
Accordingly, the discussion of pro se representation focuses on P employees, as neither of
the other groups provides a sufficient number of cases for a comparison. The AAA
employment arbitration rules ensure the right to counsel and offer assistance in finding
counsel. AAA's 1999 RULES, RULE 14, supra note 18. But the rules also expressly
contemplate pro se employment arbitration. Id.; see also AMERICAN ARBITRATIION
ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES, RULE 14
(effective Nov. 1, 2001) RULE 14.
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a. Win Rates and Win/Loss Ratios
Table 16. Win and Loss Data on P Employees Proceeding Pro Se and
with Counsel
Total Win/Loss
Number of Number of Number of Ratio
Cases Cases Won Cases Lost (cases won/
cases lost)
Total EE-P 121 40 81 .49
Cases
EE-P Pro Se 40 13 27 .48
EE-P withCone 81 27 54 
.5Counsel
The win/loss ratios for P employees who proceeded pro se and P employees
who proceeded with counsel are not significantly different. Moreover, the pro se
employees did not face any lesser substantial group of opponents than the P
employees with counsel. Specifically, the pro se P employees defeated 33
attorneys, six human resources representatives, and one corporate representative.
The favorable comparison between the win/loss ratios for represented and
pro se P employees reflects well on the intelligence and sophistication of P
employees and the fairness of AAA arbitrators. It indicates that they understood
their cases and the AAA arbitration procedure. It also reflects well on the
accessibility of the AAA rules regarding arbitration procedure to lay people.
The following table represents the overall win rates and win/loss ratios of all
parties.
Table 17. Win/Loss Ratios by Party
Total % of % of Win/LossTotal Ratio
Number Number Number TotalCases (cases
Party of Cases of Cases of Cases Cases won!
Involving Won Which Lost Party caseParty Party casesWon Lost lost)
ER 200 114 57% 86 43% 1.3
EE 200 86 43% 114 57% .75
EE-P 121 41 33.9% 80 66.1% .51
EE-N 79 45 56.96% 34 43.04% 1.3
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Clearly, the win rate and win/loss ratio of the P employees was lower than
that of the N employees and the employers. The reasons for this disparity are
discussed in Part IV.C.2.a. The fact that one third of the P employees proceeded
pro se, however, was clearly not a cause of the relatively low P employee
win/loss ratio. The data show that the win rate and win/loss ratio for those P
employees who proceeded pro se was comparable to those who proceeded with
counsel.
b. Demand and Award Data
The following Tables 18 and 19 show demand and award data for cases
prosecuted by P employees proceeding pro se and with counsel.
Table 18. Demand and Award Data for P Employees
Pro Se and with Counsel
# of # # o f # of##of #of
Total Awards Demands # Of u#aofe Non-Total Awards as % of for Monetary Equitable dollarCases #o Moeay Awards Awards AadWon # of Monetary Won Won Awards
Cases Awards Won
EE-P
rep'd 40 13 0.325 13 6 7 0
Pro Se
EE-P
with 81 28 0.346 24 21 5 2
Counsel
* "Non-dollar" awards means monetary awards not expressed in a specific
number of dollars, such as awards of pension benefits described only as
"pension benefits, "etc.
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Table 19. Amounts of Monetary Demands by P Employees
Pro Se and with Counsel
Number Amount Amount Amount Amount
of of of of Standard
of Lowest Median Highest Mean Deviation
Demand Demand Demand Demand
EE-PProP 13 $3,598 $25,000 $1,845,500 $203,968 $510,946.1Pro Se
EE-PPro 12 $3,598 $21,750 $500,000 $67,174 $139,353.5Pro Se 2"
EE-P
with 23 $428 $75,000 $298,800 $93,448 $85,143.4
Counsel
*This row of awards excludes the highest demand from the EE-P pro se
group in order to arrive at a more representative mean demand.
Table 18 shows that both the P employees who were represented by
attorneys and the P employees who proceeded pro se won 100% of the monetary
awards they sought. Again, this is an indication that P employees who proceeded
pro se performed as well as those that proceeded with counsel. The otherpro se
findings in Table 18 are in numbers too small to be statistically significant.
Nevertheless, I include them here for their value as case study material.
There were 13 demands for specific monetary relief in the pro se group, and
24 in the group with representation. The demand amounts are an indication that
P employees chose to retain counsel when they believed they had more at stake.
At first glance, the mean pro se demand of $203,968 is higher than the mean
demand of the represented group: $93,448. See Table 19. But the larger size of
the mean pro se demand is due to a single demand at the top of the scale for
$1,845,500. This demand is an isolated instance of such a large demand. If this
highest demand is removed from the group of pro se demands, the mean demand
drops from $203,968 to $67,174. See Table 19, "Pro Se 2." This revised mean
pro se demand is less than the mean demand by P employees with counsel,
$93,448, and indicates that P employees chose to hire counsel when they
believed they had a larger claim at stake.
In conclusion, the available data indicate that P employees who proceeded
pro se performed as well as those that proceeded with counsel, partly due to the
fact that the AAA's rules are comprehensible to lay people. Further, it appears
that P employees rationally chose to retain counsel when the financial stakes of
the arbitration became higher. Consequently, the data indicate that pro se
arbitration is not a problem area in this review of due process concerns.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
5. The Speed of Arbitration
Arbitration is commonly believed to be a relatively speedy means of dispute
resolution. The average length of arbitration, measured from the filing of the
demand for arbitration to the date of the award, was 8.2 months, based on this
sample. However, an accurate measure of the length of arbitration cannot be
based on this sample alone. As of November 5, 2000, the termination date for the
lengthiest arbitration in our sample, there were many cases initiated in 1999 and
2000 which had not yet terminated. Therefore, 8.2 months does not represent the
true average length for all cases initiated in those years ending in awards. We
must consider all cases which terminated in awards.
The AAA supplied me with data concerning all cases initiated in 1999 and
2000 which had terminated as of September 2002, whether by award or
otherwise. Based on that data, I was able to estimate the average length of all
cases initiated in 1999 and 2000 ending in an award. The average length was
15.2 months. 126
1261 estimated the average time from demand to award by estimating the length of the
individual cases which might have been included in a sample of all awards initiated in 1999
and 2000, assuming all cases initiated in 1999 and 2000 were completed. The average time
from demand to award in my pool of 200 awards was 246.97 days, or 8.2 months. My 200
awards represented the pool of 356 awards rendered from the total pool of cases initiated in
1999 and 2000 on or before November 5, 2000. Between November 5, 2000 and September
1, 2002, an additional 429 awards were rendered. Imagine that my sample were expanded to
include a sample of these 429 awards. The original 200 awards comprised 56% of the 356
award pool. Therefore, the additional sample of the 429 awards would be 56% of 429, or
240 additional awards. The additional sample of 240 awards would be divided into two
groups of 120 each, because I estimate that approximately half of them would have been
initiated in each of 1999 and 2000. I make this estimate because 1340 cases of the total pool
were initiated in 1999 and 1372 cases were initiated in 2000. I don't know when during each
year these 240 cases would have been initiated, so I estimate that the initiation dates would
average at the mid-points: July 1, 1999 and July 1, 2000. 1 don't know when these cases
would have ended in awards, but I know that the awards were rendered sometime after
November 5, 2000 and on or before September 1, 2002. So I chose an approximate mid-
point of October 1, 2001. Therefore, I added two groups of estimated individual awards to
my sample. Group one consisted of 120 cases initiated on July 1, 1999 and terminated in an
award on October 1, 2001. And Group two consisted of 120 cases initiated on July 1, 2000
and terminated in an award on October 1, 2001. Averaging these two groups of estimated
additional awards and my original sample, the average time from demand to award is 15.18
months. As of September 1, 2002, there were only 103 cases initiated in 1999 and 2000 that
were still pending. Of the 2613 cases which were terminated as of September 1,2002, only
34%, or 885, ended in an award. Assuming that only 34% of the pending 103 cases result in
an award, there are only 35 awards outstanding. Thirty-five awards comprise less than 8% of
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6. An Opportunity to Be Heard
Table 20 summarizes the data as to the number of days required for each
arbitration hearing in the sample.
Table 20. Number of Days in AAA Employment Arbitration Hearings
Low Median High Mean StandardDeviation
0 127 1 12 1.85 1.56
Over 96% of the claimants in this sample received their "day in court," and
"a day in court" aptly describes the arbitration hearing. Some 89% of the claims
were successfully resolved after one to three days of hearings.
7. A Decision on the Merits
AAA rule 34 states that the arbitrator will provide the "written reasons" for
the award, in keeping with due process. 128 In this sample, 89% of the awards
comply with this rule. This practice compares favorably with the NYSE and
NASD, neither of which require their arbitrators to provide the reasons for their
decisions in their awards. While some of the awards in this sample do not rise to
the level of a judicial opinion, the AAA did not intend to replace judicial
opinions with its awards. The intent of the rules is merely to provide "written
reasons," comprehensible to lay people, for the decisions made on the claims. 1
29
The majority of the AAA awards rise to this standard.
the 440 awards supporting my estimate. Accordingly, the estimate is sound.
127 Pursuant to AAA Rule 30, the parties may waive an oral hearing. AAA's 1999
RULES, RULE 30, supra note 18. Four cases were decided without a hearing on grounds
sufficient for summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Two cases
were wrongly dismissed based on the claimant's default. AAA Rule 23 provides that there
may be no judgment based on default; a hearing must be held, and a decision must be made
on the evidence. Id, at RULE 23. One dismissal was not explained by the accompanying
award.
128 Id., at RULE 34.
129 Interview with Robert Meade, supra note 9.
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V. CONCLUSION
Opposition to employer-sponsored employment arbitration is widespread,
strong, and based on the belief that it robs employees of the right to trial and
supplants it with a "kangaroo court" dominated by employers' interests. In
contrast, research shows that middle- and lower-income employees and
employees who arbitrated pursuant to promulgated agreements had no real,
practical right to trial. This study indicates that AAA employment arbitration
offers affordable, substantial, measurable due process to employees arbitrating
pursuant to mandatory arbitration agreements and to middle- and lower-income
employees. Ideally, this study and more research on private employment
arbitration will begin to move the political and legal debate over employment
arbitration into resolution and invention.
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EXHIBIT A
Categories of Data in My Final Database
No. Field Name
1 AAA Case Number
2 My Case Number
3 Promulgated v. Negotiated
4 Claimant 1





10 Attorney for Claimant
11 Other Type Representative
12 Respondent 1




17 Respondent 3 :EE-OR
18 Attorney for Respondent




23 Date Demand Received by AAA
24 1st Day of Hearing
25 Award Date
26 Number of Days of Hearing
27 State of Hearing
28 Date Claim Filed with Court
29 Filing Date with EEOC
30 EEOC End Date
31 EEOC Resolution
32 Filing Date with FEPA
33 End Date with FEPA
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No. Field Name
34 FEPA Resolution
35 Court Challenge to Arbitration
36 Other Related Court Suits
37 Filing Date: All Court Suits
38 Summary of Facts
39 Whether Civil Rights claim in Arbitration
40 Federal CR claim
41 State CR claim
42 Is CR Claim Meritless
43 Employee win CR claim
44 Is Decision on CR claim Wrong
45 Other (non-CR) Federal Statutory Claim
46 Other (non-CR) State Statutory Claim
47 Wrongful Discharge Claim
48 At -Will WD claim
49 Employment Handbook/Policy WD Claim
50 Other (non-WD) Common Law Claims
51 State Statutory C-Cs
52 WD C-C
53 Employment Handbook/Policy WD C-Cs
54 Other (non-WD) Common Law C-Cs
55 Who Won Arbitration: EE-OR
56 Dem: Tot. Damages Not inc.Equitable & Atty fees
57 Dem: Equitable Damages
58 Dem: damages without dollar value description
59 Dem: Punative Damages
60 Dem: Atty Fees
61 C-C Dem: Total damages not inc. Equitable & Atty fees
62 C-C Dem: Equitable Damages
63 C-C Dem: damages without dollar value description
64 C-C Dem: Punative Damages
65 C-C Dem: Atty Fees
66 Awd: Total damages not inc. Equitable. & Atty fees
67 Awd: Equitable Damages
68 Awd: damages without dollar value description
69 Awd: Punative Damages
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No. Field Name
70 Awd: Atty Fees
71 C-C awd: Total damages not inc.Equitable. & Attys Fees
72 C-C awd: Equitable Damages
73 C-C awd: damages without dollar value description
74 C-C awd: Punative Damages
75 C-C awd: Attorney Fees
76 Amount of Arbitrator Fees
77 EE-OR to pay Arbitrator Fees
78 Amt. of AAA Filing Fees
79 EE-OR to pay Filing Fees
80 Amt. of AAA Hearing Fees
81 EE-OR pay Hearing Fees
82 Whether OR maintains DRP
83 Procedural Rules at Hearing
94 Reasoned Opinion
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